Wittgenstein's Concept of the Language Game
In general
In Wittgenstein's concept of the language game, language and action are closely interwoven. Wittgenstein argues that the meaning of words and sentences cannot be considered in isolation but always stands in the context of actions and practices. He calls the whole, consisting of language and the activities with which it is interwoven, a "language game".
A word, a concept or a sentence does not have its meaning independently of what one does with that word, concept or sentence and in which situation one utters it. This means that the meaning of language is determined by its use in particular contexts and practices1.
In summary, one can say that in Wittgenstein's concept of the language game, language and action are inseparably interwoven. The meaning of linguistic utterances arises from their use in particular social contexts and forms of life, and the variety of language games shows how language is embedded in different practices and actions.
In detail
Wittgenstein's concept of "language games" is central to his late philosophy ("Philosophical Investigations") and marks a radical break with his earlier thinking in the "Tractatus".
What are language games?
For Wittgenstein, language games are the manifold ways in which we use language in everyday life. The term emphasizes that language has no uniform, fixed structure but consists of countless different activities - similar to how there are many different games (chess, football, solitaire) that are all "games" but share no common essence.
For Wittgenstein, the individual language games are always embedded in a form of life. A form of life comprises the totality of patterns of action in a culture. Speaking the language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.
Core ideas
Language as activity: Wittgenstein shows that speaking is part of our form of life. Words get their meaning not through what they depict but through their use in particular contexts. "The meaning of a word is its use in the language."
Variety of uses: There are countless language games - commanding, describing, reporting, making jokes, praying, cursing, greeting, thanking. Each has its own rules and purposes. A word can have completely different functions in different language games.
Rule-guidedness: As with games, in speaking we follow certain rules, mostly without being aware of them. These rules are not rigid but develop in practice.
Examples
Wittgenstein gives many vivid examples: A construction worker calls "Slab!" and his colleague hands him one. Here the word is part of an action, not mere description. Or the language game of shopping: "Five red apples" on a note triggers certain actions in the shopkeeper.
Philosophical consequences
This view dissolves many traditional philosophical problems by showing that they often rest on a misunderstanding of how our language works. Philosophical confusion arises when we take words out of their normal language game and ask for their "true meaning".
The language-game conception shows: there is no privileged philosophical perspective outside language. We can understand language only from within, as participants in language games.
Origin and development
Wittgenstein developed the concept of language games mainly during his second Cambridge period (1929-1947). The most important places and writings:
Philosophical Investigations (posthumously 1953): Here is found the mature presentation of the language-game theory. Wittgenstein worked on it from the 1930s until his death in 1951.
The Blue and Brown Books (1933-1935): In these dictations to his students the term appears systematically for the first time.
Lectures in Cambridge: In the 1930s and 1940s he developed these ideas further in dialogue with students like Norman Malcolm and Rush Rhees.
The turn came through his dissatisfaction with the "Tractatus" and was influenced by his time as a primary school teacher in Austria (1920-1926), where he experienced the practical variety of language use at first hand.
Main critics and their objections
Jerry Fodor was one of the sharpest critics. He argued that Wittgenstein's use theory could not explain the systematicity and productivity of language. For Fodor there is indeed a "language of thought" with fixed meanings.
Michael Dummett criticized that Wittgenstein's anti-systematics went too far. One can well develop systematic theories of meaning without falling into the traps of the Tractatus.
Ernest Gellner attacked Wittgenstein head-on in "Words and Things" (1959). He saw in language-game philosophy a conservative relativism that prevents critical thinking and uncritically accepts existing linguistic practices.
Bertrand Russell, Wittgenstein's former mentor, was deeply disappointed by the late philosophy. He saw in it a retreat from serious philosophical theory-building toward trivial observations of language.
Noam Chomsky implicitly criticized Wittgenstein's approach through his theory of innate universal grammar. For Chomsky there are indeed universal language structures beyond local language games.
Karl Popper accused Wittgenstein of trivializing real philosophical problems. The claim that philosophical problems are only confusions of language is itself a dogmatic philosophical thesis.
The debate still resonates today: systematic philosophers of language often see in Wittgenstein's approach a capitulation to the complexity of language, while his followers see precisely in this his strength.